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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

HOMELESSNESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TOWARDS AN
INTEGRATED STRATEGY

MARIA FOSCARINIS*
Years ago, a volunteer team of lawyers staffed a legal clinic at a shelter in
Washington, D.C. Any resident who felt a need for legal counsel could come
to the folding table we had set up in the shelter hall way. Quite a few did,
bringing a wide range of problems: evictions, benefit denials, unpaid wages.
While their circumstances were unusually desperate, these clients presented
routine legal problems. Others had more complicated stories involving the
CIA, radio waves and thought control. These problems we did not generally
think of as legal: we referred these clients to the social workers thinking,
almost certainly mistakenly, that there was a mental health treatment program
for them.
Then there was the third, large category of people who came to the clinic,
explaining that they had lost their job, or could not find housing they could
afford on their welfare checks or their wages as day laborers. From their
perspective, at least, these were problems that lawyers might be able to help
address. But for us, these were the cases that were the most frustrating and
unsettling: existing sources of aid—such as subsidized housing and jobs
programs—were generally filled beyond capacity. As lawyers seeking redress
within existing laws, there was not much that we could do.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers and legal advocacy have played a crucial role in addressing
homelessness since it became a major social problem in the United States in
the 1980s. Lawyers have sought to bring the power, influence and strategies of
the law and legal profession to bear in bringing about solutions to
homelessness. This advocacy has resulted in important gains: it has raised
public awareness, informed policy and decision makers, and provided concrete
aid that has alleviated suffering and helped people move out of homelessness.
At the same time, however, legal advocacy has been circumscribed by the
traditional parameters and constraints of the US legal system. The most

* Executive Director, National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty; A.B. Barnard College
(1977); M.A. Columbia University (1978); J.D. Columbia University (1981). I wish to
acknowledge Michael Willis and Bobby Le for research assistance drawn upon for this article.
327

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

328

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:327

important elements of solutions—long-term and immediate—to homelessness
are housing, jobs and medical care.1 But there is little or no constitutional
basis for protecting or creating access to these necessities; nor are there broad
statutory guarantees of access to them. Statutory schemes have been restricted
to particular categories of persons in need, limited by funding levels
significantly lower than need, or both.2 Indeed, our legal system is commonly
described as one that protects civil and political rights, but not economic or
social rights.3 As a result, legal advocacy to address and redress homelessness
proceeds on a somewhat ambiguous foundation. In some important ways,
there is an imperfect fit between the problem and the legal tools currently
available to address it.
In the face of this disconnect, lawyers have been creative in devising legal
strategies to effectively pursue solutions. Litigation, legislative advocacy and
regulatory advocacy have all been successful in bringing some relief. Through
such strategies, lawyers have also engaged in efforts to overcome or
compensate for the limitations of current law by pressing for new laws, by
establishing the political rights that might create the constituency to support
them, and by advocating for access to larger systems of aid and the broader
coalitions of political support they carry. But the limitations of these strategies
have also resulted in some paradoxical remedies, misguided legal and policy
debates, and unclear directions for the future.
This essay considers whether and how human rights principles can help
resolve these tensions, adding to efforts to end homelessness. To establish a
context, it begins with an overview of litigation and legislative advocacy to
date, briefly reviewing major strategies, cases, and statutes; it also discusses
imitations of these approaches, and some impacts of these limitations. The
essay then considers relevant human rights principles, approaches and
instruments, and whether they can be useful aids in addressing homelessness in
the US. The essay concludes with examples of potential uses of human rights
and describes some current strategies to begin implementing them.

1. MARTHA BURT, OVER THE EDGE 120-26 (1992); United States Conference of Mayors, A
Status Report on Hunger and Homelessness in America’s Cities, at 66 (2000).
2. Further, systems that have been put in place have been eroded, as with the repeal of
welfare benefits for needy families as an entitlement.
3. In theory, the former should ensure a democratic process in which everyone’s interests in
the latter can be addressed. Nevertheless, whatever the merits of this theory, the current reality is
that for some significant number of Americans basic needs are not met, in the most extreme cases
resulting in homelessness. Further, homeless Americans are often—and by virtue of their
status—excluded from the political process as well.
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II. LEGAL ADVOCACY TO DATE: SUMMARY OVERVIEW
Legal advocacy on behalf of homeless people over the past two decades
has employed a wide range of strategies and focused on multiple substantive
areas. Legal strategies to date have included litigation to enforce existing laws,
legislative and regulatory advocacy to create new laws, and subsequent
litigation to enforce those new laws. Substantively, these strategies have
focused on a range of issues and goals: from meeting immediate and longerterm needs for food and shelter, to opening access to “mainstream” programs,
to establishing political rights, to challenging efforts to “criminalize”
homelessness.
Initially relying on litigation under existing laws, advocates expanded their
efforts to include legislative and regulatory advocacy in order to move beyond
the limitations of existing laws. The successes of this approach led to more
litigation to enforce the new laws. Local monitoring of compliance with and
implementation of laws has been crucial to that follow-up process, and
outreach to inform local advocates and potential beneficiaries of legal rights
has been essential. Through this effort, the importance of local partnerships
and collaborations has also become apparent, giving rise to further options for
advocacy. Currently, successful advocacy often depends on the integration of
a wide variety of different strategies.4
It is, however, possible to identify some overall trends over the past two
decades of legal advocacy on behalf of homeless persons. In broad outline,
early legal advocacy focused on addressing immediate basic needs of homeless
persons, such as shelter and food, through both litigation and then legislation.
Later legal advocacy focused on prevention, such as discharge planning and
transitional housing, and on establishing political and civil rights, again
through both legislation and litigation. Current legislative efforts are focused
on longer-term solutions, such as housing and access to mainstream programs;
current litigation is focused on access to mainstream programs as well as
challenges to efforts to “criminalize” homelessness.
In general, the overall direction of advocacy can thus be characterized as a
movement from emergency to longer-term solutions. Both sorts of solutions
are necessary, and generally part of advocacy agendas; emergency aid is
typically easier to achieve. In light of this progression, the appearance of the
criminalization trend is not surprising: the emergency solutions that have been
achieved to date have been almost by definition insufficient to solve the
problem, while giving the impression to policymakers and the public that

4. Litigation is limited by the constitutional and statutory context in which it occurs; in
many ways, legislative advocacy has attempted to fill the gaps and redress the limitations of
litigation.
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solutions are in place. As the problem has nonetheless continues to grow,
simply criminalizing it has become increasingly easier to justify.5
To date, however, what is missing from these efforts is an articulated,
specific commitment to underlying rights to basic subsistence. While
advocacy organizations often subscribe to basic principles of social justice that
incorporate such rights, these may be difficult to integrate into legal advocacy
strategies. Including human rights law and principles in such strategies may be
one way to bridge this gap, strengthening legal advocacy and providing a
clearer direction and firmer basis for moving forward.
The right to shelter and other immediate basic needs. Probably the most
significant early legal advocacy was that focused on establishing a right to
shelter in New York City. In Callahan v. Carey, a New York State trial court
held that homeless plaintiffs had a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on their
claim that state constitutional and statutory requirements that the city care for
the needy included an obligation to shelter the homeless.6 Following that
ruling, plaintiffs and the city entered into a consent decree obligating the city
to provide overnight shelter and food to every needy homeless man and
detailing minimum shelter standards.7 Several subsequent cases resulted in the
establishment of similar rights to shelter in other parts of the country under
state statutory provisions, either by court ruling8 or consent decree,9 under a
federal statute,10 and by ballot initiative.11

5. See Maria Foscarinis, Beyond Homelessness: Ethics, Advocacy and Strategy, 12 ST.
LOUIS PUB. L. REV. 37 (1993), for a discussion of some of the considerations, trade-offs and
consequences of advocacy for short- and long-term solutions.
6. Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1979) (ruling on a motion for
preliminary injunction), reprinted in N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10. The constitutional provision
the court relied on states: “The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be
provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as
the legislature may from time to time determine.” N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. The state statute
provides that “each public welfare district shall be responsible for the assistance and care of any
person who resides or is found in its territory and who is in need of public assistance and care
which he is unable to provide for himself.” N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 62(1).
7. Callahan v. Carey, No. 42582/79 (1981). Subsequent cases expanded this right to
women, Eldredge v. Koch, 459 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983), and families, McCain v.
Koch, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1986).
8. See, e.g., Maticka v. Atlantic City, 524 A.2d 416, 418-19 (1991) (relying on state statute
providing that “[i]mmediate public assistance shall be rendered promptly to any needy person by
the director of welfare of the municipality”); Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W.Va. 1983)
(required state to provide shelter, food and medical care to homeless persons, relying on state
adult protective services statute requiring aid to “incapacitated adults” who by reason of physical,
mental or other infirmity [are] unable to independently carry on the daily activities of life
necessary to sustaining life and reasonable health).
9. See, e.g., Graham v. Schomehl, No. 854-00035 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 1985).
10. See Koster v. Webb, 598 F. Supp. 1134 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (federal emergency assistance
to families program, optional program within the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
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At the national level, funds for emergency food and shelter through the
federal disaster relief program were appropriated for homeless persons on an
ad hoc basis beginning in 1983.12 In 1986, legislation creating and funding
“demonstration” shelter and housing programs for the homeless was enacted.13
Also enacted in 1986 was the Homeless Eligibility Clarification Act, which
removed permanent address requirements from a series of federal benefit
In 1987, the first major federal legislation addressing
programs.14
homelessness, the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, was passed,
incorporating shelter, transitional housing and a small permanent housing
program as central elements;15 and creating some property rights to unused
federal properties for groups serving homeless people.16 Following passage of
the legislation, advocates initiated monitoring efforts to determining whether
its programs were being properly implemented, and followed up with
successful litigation to correct non-compliance.17
program, required states opting in to it and agreeing in their state plans to provide emergency
shelter to actually do so). Subsequent litigation also established some procedural rights to notice
and an opportunity to be heard before shelter could be withdrawn, Williams v. Barry, 708 F.2d
789, 790 (1983) and a right to have some procedures in place, Russell v. Barry, 1987 WL 15697
(D.D.C. 1987).
11. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-601(1988) (repealed 1994).
12. Emergency Job Appropriations Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-8 (1983). See also
Foscarinis, Beyond Homelessness, supra note 5, at 44-45 & n.34.
13. In the mid-1980’s, a coalition of advocates developed proposed legislation to address
homelessness. The Homeless Persons’ Survival Act of 1986 contained three titles: emergency
aid, preventive measures, and long-term solutions. It was introduced in both the House and
Senate in 1986. H.R. 286, 99th Cong. (1986); S. 2608, 99th Cong. (1986). In 1987, much of the
emergency title was enacted as the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act.
14. Homeless Eligibility Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570 (1986).
15. The Homeless Housing Act, passed in October 1986, created two “demonstration”
programs, to fund emergency shelter (at $10 million) and to fund transitional housing (at $5
million). Pub. L No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 1783 (1986). Both were incorporated, in greatly expanded
form, as programs of the Stewart B. McKinney Act in 1987. 42 U.S.C. §11411 (Supp. 1987).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 11301(a)(1),(6). Section 501 of Title V of the McKinney Act, created a
right of first refusal for state and local government and non-profit entities providing services to
homeless people. Id. at §§ 11411-12; see also National Coalition for the Homeless v. Veteran’s
Administration, 695 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1988); National Law Center on Homelessness &
Poverty v. Veterans Administration, 736 F. Supp. 1148 (1990); 765 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991),
aff’d, 964 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1992), modified, 819 F. Supp. 69 (D.D.C. 1993).
17. See National Coalition for the Homeless v. Pierce, No. 87-2640 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 28,
1987) (suit to require HUD to distribute emergency shelter funds timely); National Coalition for
the Homeless v. Veteran’s Administration, 695 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1988); National Law
Center on Homelessness & Poverty v. Veterans Administration, 736 F. Supp. 1148 (1990); 765 F
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d, 964 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1992), modified, 819 F. Supp. 69 (D.D.C.
1993), 98 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2000) (permanent injunction requiring five federal agencies to
comply with McKinney Act program to make unused federal property available for programs to
aid homeless; subsequent enforcement orders); see also Senior Resources v. Cuomo, No. 97-1445
(D.D.C. 1998).
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Since these early efforts, advocacy to meet homeless persons’ immediate
needs has evolved and changed. In New York City, while the Callahan decree
initially resulted in significant legal and practical success in requiring the
provision of emergency shelter, advocates expended much effort in attempting
to ensure government compliance with the right to shelter,18 and city officials
imposed restrictions narrowing the right.19 In Washington, D.C., in the face of
repeated contempt orders,20 city officials sought changes in the law to
undermine the basis for the right. The result was the elimination of the right.21
Changes at the federal level have been more positive. Funding for the
McKinney shelter and housing programs has increased somewhat significantly.
In 1987, appropriations for these programs stood at $190 million; currently, for
2001, they are $1.26 billion. The McKinney Act programs have also changed
substantively, with increased emphasis on long-term, not just emergency,
solutions.22 At the same time, there has been increased emphasis on creating
collaborative local processes to address the needs of homeless people. For
example, the HUD McKinney programs are now distributed through a
“Continuum of Care” process that brings together local government and nonprofit providers, through a process aimed at collaboratively devising a plan to
meet the needs of homeless persons in the community. 23
Limitations of this approach. Legal advocacy that is focused on the right
to shelter and other immediate basic needs has a built-in limitation: it seeks a
temporary solution. If the problem were simply short-term, this would not
matter: for instance, where homelessness results from flood, hurricane or other
natural disaster, and not from poverty, emergency solutions may be appropriate
and effective. In those cases, once the sudden emergency is addressed, its
victims are generally able to return to housing stability. Where the cause is
poverty-related—such as the inability to find affordable housing, get a job at
wage sufficient to pay for housing, or to obtain mental-health care or substance
abuse treatment—then emergency shelter is not a sufficient solution to
18. See, e.g., McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198 (1986).
19. See, e.g., McCain v. Guliani, 252 A.D.2d 461 (1998), appeal dismissed, 93 N.Y. 21 848
(1999).
20. See, e.g., Aitchenson v. District of Columbia, 585 A.2d 150,151 (1991).
21. District of Columbia Emergency Overnight Shelter Amendment Act of 1990, D.C. LAw
8-197, 37 DCR 4815 (1990) (codified as D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-206.9a).
22. See Interagency Council on Homelessness, Priority Home! (1994); Maria Foscarinis,
The Federal Response: The Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, in HOMELESSNESS IN
AMERICA (J. Baumhol, ed. 1996).
23. Later amendments and legislation added to the McKinney Act. For example, special
legislation addressed the use of closed military bases, removing their disposition from the
McKinney Act property program and creating a new legislative process that addresses their
conversion to civilian use more broadly, but requires that process to address the needs of
homeless persons and include their representatives. Rather than a rights-based approach,
however, this is a process-oriented scheme.
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homelessness: once the emergency need is met, there is nowhere to go. While
shelters when available can provide important immediate relief, they are not
appropriate as a long-term solution. It is important to emphasize that currently
there is not nearly enough emergency shelters available to meet the need, and
shelter regularly turn away requests for help.24
On a practical level, emergency shelters also raise safety, privacy, and
health concerns for homeless people. The rules and restrictions shelters
impose in order to operate efficiently—such as the lack of private telephone
access, curfews that require clients to leave very early in the morning or return
early in the afternoon or evening—may compromise the ability of homeless
persons to look for employment or housing.25 Moreover, shelters typically
impose time limits, ranging from a few days to several months. But without
sufficient permanent, affordable housing—and without permanent supportive
housing for those who need it—there may be nowhere to move to upon leaving
shelter accommodations.26
One result is that some homeless people may reject staying in a shelter in
these circumstances and instead “choose” to live in public places,
encampments or abandoned buildings.
Because there is little public
understanding of the limitations of shelter and the lack of long-term housing
options, these homeless people may then be perceived to have “chosen’’ the
homeless “lifestyle.”27 Debates ensue about freedom and whether it is
appropriate to force someone to accept help, diverting attention away from the
nature and availability of that help.
In a further paradox, because of the lack of permanent housing, shelters
tend to become permanent, and those who do use them on a longer-term basis
may become dependent and “institutionalized,” rather than self sufficient.28
Shelter may also become acceptable in the public eye as housing of last resort,
defining societal notions of acceptable minimum safety net standards
downward. At the same time, the limitations of shelters mean that
homelessness remains unsolved—and people remain on the street or in other
public places—and the problem begins to be perceived as “intractable.” The

24. See, e.g., U.S Conference of Mayors, A Status Report on Hunger and Homelessness, in
AMERICAS CITIES 61 (2000) [hereinafter A Status Report].
25. For a description of such difficulties, see National Law Center on Homelessness &
Poverty, Broken Contract: Failing the District of Columbia’s Welfare Recipients (1999)
(Describing barrier homeless families living in transitional housing facilities face in complying
with welfare law’s work requirements).
26. See, e.g., A Status Report, supra note 24.
27. See Kim Hopper & Jim Baumhol, Held in Abeyance: Rethinking Homelessness and
Advocacy, 37 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 522 (1994) (for a discussion of unintended but harmful
consequences of emergency aid in “framing” homelessness as a problem separate from poverty
and its systemic sources).
28. See id. at 537 (discussing “shelterization” of homeless).
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result is further loss of public will to address it, opening the way to simply
blaming or demonizing homeless people.29 Completing the cycle, homeless
people are then seen as not only not “like you and me” but completely
“other.”30 This may lead to divisiveness, hostility and in some cases even
violence.31
Advocates seeking to counter these characterizations may then find
themselves arguing for a view of homelessness that honors homeless persons’
agency and self-determination.32 From a completely different perspective,
such advocates may also be neglecting or minimizing the important realities of
homelessness: the lack of resources—housing, income, services, and shelter—
that do force many people to live in public places. But calling homelessness
“involuntary” does not need to be interpreted as diminishing anyone’s capacity
for self-determination. Nor is recognizing that homeless people suffer
disproportionately from physical and mental disabilities and illnesses
necessarily patronizing.
While acknowledging the significance of respect, it is important to
remember that facts sometimes are just facts.33 In fact, there is not enough
housing, or employment opportunity, or healthcare. Indeed, stepping back
from this sort of debate suggests that it is at least to some extent a byproduct of
a legal strategy aimed at securing emergency shelter. If instead we focus our
attention on the need for longer-term solutions to homelessness—such as
housing, jobs and health care—then many of these issues become irrelevant.
For example, if there were sufficient housing, jobs and healthcare, homeless
29. Often, the result is charity-style, emergency aid to meet immediate needs, or structuring
aid designed to correct the assumed character or moral defects.
30. A recurring debate has centered on whether homeless people are “just like you and me,”
as sometimes stated by advocates, see Burt, supra note 1, at 21 (rather suffer from personal
“pathologies,” as claimed by some commentators); see, e.g., ALICE S. BAUM & DONALD W.
BURNES, A NATION IN DENIAL 153 (1993).
31. See discussion of “criminalization” of homelessness, infra notes 50-57 and
accompanying text.
32. E.g., Wes Daniels, “Derelicts,” Recurring Misfortune, Economic Hard Times and
Lifestyle Choices: Judicial Images of Homeless Litigants and Implications for Legal Advocates,
45 BUFF. L. REV. 687 (1997).
It also does not necessarily imply individual helplessness. The shortage of affordable
housing means that some set of persons will be left out; this fact does not depend on individual
choice. Which individuals fall into that set is, to some extent, dependent on individual choices,
actions or circumstances. Klostermann v. Cuomo, 481 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1984). See also Palmer v.
Cuomo, 503 N.Y.S.2d 20, 22 (1986).
33. Instead of trying to change, rename or reinterpret them, we may be better off examining
the theoretical and practical structures in which they play out. Why isn’t there sufficient
permanent affordable housing? Why isn’t there even enough shelter? And why isn’t that shelter
geared towards helping people into self-sufficiency and housing? If the answer is again that there
is a lack of affordable housing and supportive housing, then debate—and action—is better
focused on those issues.
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people would not be forced to choose between emergency shelter and
autonomy.
Homelessness prevention. Legal advocacy to prevent homelessness seeks
to engage these underlying causal factors. Such advocacy has generally
focused on persons in a variety of state programs or custody arrangements who
are at risk of homelessness. For example, advocates have successfully argued
that, under state law, state psychiatric institutions must address housing in
planning for the discharge of patients,34 and that state-determined welfare
benefit levels must be sufficient to allow recipient families to maintain their
own housing.35 In these cases, the focus was on persons who were wards of
the state or beneficiaries of government aid; thus, advocacy to prevent
homelessness could build on already-established government duty. Along
similar lines, in 1986 federal legislation established a pre-release program to
allow institutionalized persons to apply for food stamps and SSI benefits prior
to their release, in order to prevent their becoming homeless upon release.36
State legislation has created special programs to prevent persons from
becoming homeless through the loss of their own housing due to some sudden
emergency event. For example, the Homelessness Prevention Program in New
Jersey provides a pool of funds that those at risk of homelessness through
eviction or foreclosure can borrow from in order to avert that risk; several
other states have adopted similar programs. While successful, however, these
programs are limited in scope: the New Jersey program, among the largest, can
aid only a fraction of families that seek it help.37 This type of program does
not represent a right or entitlement, but rather a limited sum of money set aside
for a specific purpose.
A different prevention-oriented approach focuses on gaining access for
homeless people to “mainstream” entitlements that could provide resources to
help them out of homelessness.38 For example, the McKinney Act protects the
right of homeless children to enroll in and attend public school and pre-school,
34. Klostermann, 81 N.Y.S. 2d. at 580. See also Palmer, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 20 (court required
New York state welfare agencies to provide services to youth “aging out” of foster care to prevent
them from becoming homeless).
35. Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v. HHS, 511 N.E.2d 603 (Mass. 1987).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(m) (1992); see also National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty,
Abandoned to the Streets (1992).
37. Department of Community Affairs, Division of Housing and Community Resources,
State of New Jersey, Annual Performance Report, at 6 (1999) [hereinafter Annual Performance
Report]; U.S. Government Accounting Office, Homelessness: Too Early to Tell What Kind of
Prevention Assistance Works Best (1990).
38. Because most government systems assume that applicants and recipients have fixed
addresses, homeless persons are often excluded from their aid, and thus driven deeper into
poverty and isolation; advocacy to remove and address such barriers can help people out of
homelessness. See General Accounting Office, Homelessness: Barriers to Using Mainstream
Services (2000).
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and sets forth special procedures to accommodate their circumstances and
ensure their ability to exercise this right.39 Legislation also protects the right of
homeless persons to receive SSI, veterans and Medicaid benefits despite their
lack of a permanent address.40 Similarly, legislative and regulatory advocacy
led to the removal of IRS language that required applicants for the Earned
Income Tax Credit to be living in a “home,” thus expanding eligibility to the
large percentage of homeless people who work. 41
Limitations of this approach. Much of this prevention-oriented advocacy,
while effective, has been and is constrained by the limited resources available
to implement remedies when they are won—as well as to carry out the
advocacy itself. In part, this is because of limitations in the legal system, and
the difficulty in compelling government agencies to spend additional funds to
carry out court rulings. Advocacy is limited by political constraints: the
absence of a powerful constituency means that programs and policies created
to prevent homelessness lack a strong base of support, and typically remain too
limited in scope to meet anything approaching the entire need. More
fundamentally, though, here too there is a built in limitation: resources are
typically spent according to specific allocations, and not according to need.42
Partly in response to resource limitations, some advocacy has focused on
targeting, setting aside, or prioritizing resources to meet the needs of homeless
people, which are presumably most urgent. Precisely because resource
allocation amounts are not tied to need, however, this can lead to paradoxical
results. On a practical level, by taking resources away from low-income
housing for the poor, it increases the risk of homelessness for the overall
poverty population. On a policy level it can lead to proposals to create

39. Subsequent litigation established the enforceability of homeless children’s right to
education. Lampkin v. District of Columbia, 27 F.3d 605, 612 (1994).
40. Homeless Eligibility Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-167 (1986)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1988)).
41. Advocates initially obtained committee report language in a tax bill acknowledging that
significant numbers of homeless people worked, and urging the IRS to explore using outreach
programs to educate these homeless workers about the EITC. Following the inclusion of such
language by Congress, advocates were able to persuade the IRS to revise its instructions to
remove a requirement that EITC claimants have a “home.” See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13131, 107 Stat. 312, 433-35 (1993) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §
32) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
42. Sources of prevention funds are generally not “entitlement” programs. This means that a
fixed amount of funds are allocated by the legislature, and when those funds are spent, no more
can be given out, even if eligible applicants for the funds remain. As a result, some programs,
including the New Jersey Homelessness Prevention program, stop taking new applications before
the end of the year. See Annual Performance Report, supra note 37.
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substandard housing—despite health and other concerns that led to its demise
originally—as a resource-conserving solution of last resort.43
Ensuring access to “mainstream” benefits is not alone a sufficient solution
to homelessness. The low levels of many public benefits programs may
contribute to homelessness to begin with; indeed, a significant number of
homeless persons do receive welfare and other benefits, yet because those
benefits are so low relative to housing costs, they remain homeless. However,
if undertaken in coalition with other anti-poverty groups—and coupled with
advocacy for higher assistance levels—it can lead to more meaningful change.
Indeed, in some cases advocates have sought to address this underlying
problem through advocacy to increase benefits to reflect housing costs.
However, the legal basis for such advocacy is limited.
These advocacy efforts can have mixed effects on public perceptions as
well. Preventive—or emergency—programs that meet only a small portion of
the need provide crucial help to those who are assisted. They also focus
attention on the issue, the need and—in the case of preventive measures—the
causes of homelessness. But without concerted, properly framed public
education efforts, they also risk conveying the impression to policymakers and
the public that solutions are in place. Then, the fact that the problem remains
may be attributed to the perceived individual failings of those who are in fact
left out.
Political rights. A series of advocacy efforts has focused on homeless
persons’ political rights. In a court case challenging the denial of registration
to vote to homeless persons, the court held that homeless persons could not
constitutionally be denied their fundamental right to vote simply because they
lacked an address.44 Instead, the court held that homeless voters should be
permitted to show residency in a particular voting district by designating a
particular place where they regularly return and intend to remain for the
present—be it a park bench or shelter. In essence, the court required that
traditional methods of establishing and documenting residence in a particular
district be adjusted to accommodate homeless persons’ circumstances.
Following passage of the National Voter Registration Act, the Federal
Election Commission promulgated regulations specifically providing for
registration of persons with “non-traditional” residences; 45 FEC comments to
the regulation make clear that this includes “those living on city streets.”46
Outreach by national advocacy organizations to state and local advocacy and

43. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER JENKS, THE HOMELESS, at 19-20, 70-74, 113-117 (1994)
(suggesting revival of old “cage” hotels prevalent in Chicago’s skid row before the 1960’s).
44. Pitts v. Black, 608 F. Supp. 696 (1984).
45. 11 C.F.R. § 8.4(a)(2) (1995).
46. See, e.g., Margaret Sims, Voter Registration for the Homeless, 17 FEC J. ELECTION
ADMIN. at 7 (1996).
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service groups has aimed to help them inform their homeless clients about their
rights to vote, and to help them register. Such outreach efforts have also aimed
to help local groups organize campaign forums focused on homelessness,
housing, jobs and other important issues, in an effort to inject issues relevant to
homeless people into electoral campaigns. Get out the vote efforts organized
locally with national support have attempted to help homeless people actually
exercise these rights.47
Related to this advocacy are efforts to counter the exclusion and under
representation of homeless persons in the decennial U.S. census. Directly
relevant to political representation, as well as to funding allocations dependent
on poverty data, the Census Bureau in 1990 adopted a process that expressly
excluded large numbers of homeless people. After advocates challenged the
legality of this process, the Bureau issued a disclaimer, included as part of its
official data, acknowledging that they were not a “count” of the homeless
population.48 This provided some victory and relief; however, subsequent
litigation to secure further relief was unsuccessful, and no full accounting of
the homeless population occurred.49
Limitations of this approach. Advocacy on behalf of homeless people’s
political rights is important: it advances their rights as well as advocacy for
solutions to homelessness. Homeless people are widely perceived as nonvoters, and this perception is often true; the resulting political weakness of
homeless people as a constituency hampers advocacy, especially in legislative
arenas. Thus, establishing political rights appears in some ways a promising
advocacy avenue: in addition to vindicating rights that are inherently valuable,
it also is the basis on which political pressure could be exercised, building a
more potent constituency. But in practice, while this work is valuable, it is
also limited.
While political rights are of course extremely important, they are in fact
often secondary to the basic survival needs that homeless people face by virtue
of their circumstances. Further, beyond the difficulty homeless people face in
simply establishing and then exercising their political rights, organizing into a
constituency on issues specific to homelessness is even more elusive. Isolation
and lack of access to communication and transportation systems, severe and
urgent material needs—all of the factors that impede the establishment and
exercise of voting rights to begin with—also make it extremely difficult for
homeless people to come together in organized groups, formulate joint
positions, and mount letter-writing and telephone campaigns.

47. National Coalition for the Homeless and National Law Center on Homelessness &
Poverty, You Don’t Need a Home to Vote, 2000 Voter Rights Registration Packet (2000).
48. Nat’l Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty v. Kantor, 91 F.3d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
49. See id.
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In short, the traditional mechanisms by which ordinary citizens participate
in the political process—and which are assumed to be available to all in our
democratic system—are generally not available to homeless people, simply
because they are homeless. Without some minimum level of material stability,
the exercise of political rights becomes highly problematic, if not impossible.
Poor people in general are often marginalized from traditional political
processes; homeless people, however, are marginalized in ways that are deeper
and more extreme in both nature and degree. A fixed address is an essential
aspect of membership in contemporary American society; without it,
participating in any organized process or system is very difficult.
Countering the “criminalization” of homelessness. In the last decade, the
criminalization of homelessness has been a growing trend. Cities have enacted
new laws or resurrected old laws that regulate the use of public space,
imposing criminal sanctions for conduct such as sleeping or begging in public
places. This trend has been fueled by city concern over the growing presence
of homeless people in public places such as parks, sidewalks and transportation
stations, and their use of such sites as living spaces. Laws enacted or enforced
as part of this trend have been aimed specifically at homeless people, or have
had their primary impact on them.50
In response, litigation has challenged this trend, typically on federal
constitutional grounds, and such litigation has recently dominated legal
advocacy on homelessness.51 Some courts have held that where there is no
alternative but to sleep in public—where the number of shelter spaces is
smaller than the number of homeless persons—then criminal laws that prohibit
homeless persons from sleeping in any public place are unconstitutional.52

50. See generally Maria Foscarinis et. al., Out of Sight, Out of Mind? The Continuing Trend
Toward the Criminalization of Homelessness, 6 GEO J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 145 (1999);
National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, Mean Sweeps: A Report on Anti-Homeless
Laws, Litigation and Alternatives in 50 United States Cities (1996); National Law Center on
Homelessness & Poverty, Right to Remain Nowhere (1993); National Law Center on
Homelessness & Poverty, Go Directly to Jail (1991); Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral, 14
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (1996).
51. Foscarinis Downward Spiral, supra note 50, at 1.
52. Id. For example, in Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992), the
court held that the city’s policy of arresting homeless persons for sleeping in any public place
when there were only 700 shelter spaces for some 6,000 homeless persons violated the Eighth
Amendment, the right to travel, the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. Id. at
1551. The remedy proposed by the judge—but never actually implemented by the parties—was
the creation of two “safe zones,” public areas in which homeless persons could sleep without
danger of arrest. See also Johnson v. Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Tex. 1994), rev’d, 61 F.3d
442 (5th Cir. 1995) (on grounds that plaintiffs had not shown they had actually been convicted
and thus lacked standing); Church v. Huntsville, No. 93-C-1239-S (N.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 1993);
vacated 30 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1994) (on grounds that plaintiffs had not shown that challenged
actions were part of official city policy).
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Similarly, courts have held that broad restrictions on begging in public spaces
may violate the First Amendment and possibly the Equal Protection Clause.53
In these cases, courts have generally viewed begging—or solicitation—as
speech protected by the First Amendment. Homeless persons’ privacy and
belongings have also been held to be protected by the Fourth Amendment in
some cases, and traditional Fourth Amendment analysis adjusted to reflect the
reality that they are living in public: reasonable expectations of privacy have
been expanded to protect public areas where those areas are in fact someone’s
home.54
Other courts have rejected such challenges, however.55 Moreover, in the
wake of successful litigation, many cities have taken steps to try to make their
laws “litigation proof.” Most commonly, they adopt narrower public space
restrictions that do not prevent sleeping in all public spaces or at all times, thus
eliminating much of the basis of or making much more difficult the
constitutional challenge.56 Similarly, they have altered the restrictions on
begging, broadening them to cover all forms of solicitation while also focusing
them more tightly on specific conduct, again limiting the possibility of
constitutional challenge. In many cases, these are and should be taken as
victories; in some cases, they simply move the battle to the enforcement
arena.57
Limitations of this approach. By definition, countering criminalization is a
reactive approach: it fights what is a very negative, destructive and even
dangerous trend.58 As such, it tends to focus advocacy efforts and energy away
from solutions to homelessness. Further, it risks framing the issue in terms of
the assertion of “negative” freedoms; for example, the “right” to sleep on the

53. E.g., Loper v. New York City Police Dept., 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993); Benefit v.
Cambridge, SJC-07341 (Mass. May 14, 1997); Patton v. Baltimore, Civ. No. S-93-2389 (D. Md.
Aug. 19, 1994); Helen Hershkoff & Adam Cohen, Begging to Differ, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896
(1991).
54. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145 (Conn. 1991).
55. E.g., Joyce v. San Francisco, 845 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994), appeal dismissed as
moot, 87 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1996).
56. E.g., Roulette v. Seattle, 78 F.3d 1425 (9th Cir. 1996).
57. A related and also increasingly important area of advocacy concerns zoning laws that
exclude housing and services for homeless persons from certain areas. Just as with
criminalization, there has been a recent trend in some cities to enact new laws or more stringently
enforce existing laws so as to exclude or severely limit housing or service providers. Legislative
advocacy at the local level has been aimed at defeating or modifying such zoning laws, and in
some cases has succeeded; in addition, litigation has established some rights of service providers
and their homeless clients to be sited.
58. In addition to criminalization, recent years have seen an increase in violence aimed at
homeless people. National Coalition for the Homeless, No More Homeless Deaths (1999). The
convergence of these trends is probably not coincidental: private violence likely reflects, at least
in part, public hostility.
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street and other public places. Nevertheless, this is not a necessary result;
indeed, advocates can instead use criminalization efforts positively and
proactively.59
Taking advantage of city concern with the problem of homeless people
sleeping in public places, advocates can focus attention on the lack of indoor
alternative places—shelter and housing—and argue that additional resources
should be directed at those alternatives, rather than at use of the criminal
justice system. They can also reach out to the business community to lend its
political support to efforts to increase resources. In the shorter term, outreach
by social service agencies, drop in centers, training and education of local
police forces, can all be used to foster a more constructive approach, and to
build a larger constituency of concerned and informed members of the public.
Countering the criminalization of homelessness may in fact form the basis
for effective, proactive advocacy, provided it is framed properly. Taking
advantage of city and business interest in addressing the problem of people
living in public, advocacy can focus attention on the causes of and solutions to
this problem. In some ways this is an opportunity to rethink advocacy and,
informed by the experience of the past, as well as new information and models
now available, place it on a firmer footing.
*
*
*
*
Legal advocacy on homelessness has been a creative patchwork of
approaches and substantive lines of attack. Pulling together bits and pieces of
statutes, federal and state constitutional provisions, and new legislative
frameworks, advocacy has led to some new rights, benefits and legal
protections for homeless people. It has resulted in concrete benefits:
emergency shelter, food and services, transitional and some permanent
housing. It has provided specific relief to homeless men, women and children,
created and defined rights and processes to protect and accommodate them
and, in some cases, led to recognition of important rights.
However, it has also been insufficient, and led to some contradictory and
unintended consequences. Emergency aid, while critically important, does not
solve the problem. Access to “mainstream” programs, also important, does not
address the underlying substantive inadequacies of those programs. Civil and
political rights remain largely unexercised, as meeting basic survival needs
takes priority. And prevention, while obviously the key, has no dependable,
broad-based legal or political hook.
Meanwhile, largely unhelpful debates and policy initiatives flourish.
Commentators and scholars wonder why homeless people “choose” not to use

59. Unlike advocacy to counter criminalization, successfully countering exclusionary
policies can directly result in new resources for homeless people through the siting of housing or
service programs. However, this advocacy strategy is dependent on the existence of such
programs or proposed programs—and the funds on which they are predicated.
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shelters, and argue whether forcing them to accept help is legally and morally
appropriate. Others debate homeless persons’ “freedom” to live in parks and
on sidewalks versus the general public’s interest in clean and attractive public
spaces. Policymakers grapple with the need to revitalize the inner city by
attracting businesses and more affluent residents versus the interests of those
seeking to establish housing and services for the poor. While all of these
debates have some substance, they all also are missing some important point.
III. INCORPORATING A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH: CAN IT HELP STRENGTHEN
ADVOCACY?
On a fundamental level, each of these advocacy approaches may also
unintentionally reinforce the isolation of the poor and homeless. Focusing on
providing help to homeless people can set them apart from others, even though
in fact all members of society benefit from help of some kind: businesses
benefit from tax incentives, homeowners benefit from tax deductions, nonprofits benefit from tax exemptions, for example. Advocacy focusing on
specifically on the needs of some, and government obligation to meet those
needs, may skew our perspective and further isolate homeless people from the
rest of what are in fact interdependent societal structures.
Advocating for others’ rights as if they are separate from “our” rights, can
not only lead to divisiveness, albeit the more benign sort fostered by charity,
but also to a narrow base of support. One of the reasons it is so difficult to
build support—political or financial—for advocacy on homelessness and
poverty is because those seen as the direct beneficiaries are poor and
powerless. In contrast, civil liberties groups have built a far broader base of
support founded on the notion that everyone’s civil rights are jeopardized
whenever anyone’s rights are violated.
Incorporating a human rights approach into domestic advocacy may help
broaden our focus and support by laying a foundation that is more universal in
its reach. Such an approach does not necessarily imply dramatic change; it is
no magic bullet. Recognizing a right to housing would not immediately or
necessarily solve the problem of homelessness. Nor is it antithetical to a
collaborative, process-oriented approach; indeed, the human rights approach
includes and emphasizes attention to process and inclusion. Rather, it may
help us conceptualize what it is that advocacy aspires to, and provide some
legal content to those concepts.
Human rights: relevant documents. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, provides
that “[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing
and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the
event of unemployment, sickness, disability. . .or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control. . . .” In addition, the Declaration provides
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that everyone has this right, “without distinction of any kind, such as race,
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.”60 In addition, the Universal Declaration
recognizes and protects civil and political rights.61
Initially, one comprehensive human rights covenant was planned to
elaborate and flesh out the provisions of the Universal Declaration.
Ultimately, however, the provisions were divided and a pair of subsequent
conventions adopted to elaborate on the Universal Declaration: The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.62 The ICESCR elaborates
further on the meaning of an adequate standard of living and its component
elements.
States parties to the ICESCR “recognize the right of everyone to an
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate
food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living
conditions.” The ICESCR also commits the states parties to “take appropriate
steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the
essential importance of international co-operations based on free consent.”63
The committee in charge of the ICESCR’s interpretation and enforcement have
defined the right to consist of seven elements: legal security of tenure;
availability of services, resources and infrastructure; affordability; habitability;
accessibility; location; and cultural adequacy. The obligation on states consists
of four “layers:” to respect, protect, promote and fulfill the right.64 Further,
certain components of the right that can be immediately carried out, such as the
non-discrimination provisions, are immediately effective. Others are subject to
“progressive realization.”65
Recent documents, in particular, the Vancouver Declaration on Human
Settlements, and the Habitat Agenda, documents resulting from the Habitat I
and II Conferences in 1987 and 1996, respectively, elaborate further on these
concepts.66 The Habitat Agenda incorporates the right to housing, reaffirming
60. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, U.N.G.A. Res. 217 (III) (1948).
61. Id. at art. 1-21.
62. See Scott Leckie, From Housing Needs to Housing Rights: An Analysis of the Right to
Adequate Housing Under International Human Rights Law, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, at 10 (1992).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 112-113, 113 n. 27.
65. Other treaty documents also elaborate on the right to housing and elements of it. See,
e.g., the Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
66. See NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HABITAT II AND U.S.
IMPLEMENTATION: BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 4 (1998) (Habitat I was held in 1976 in
Vancouver, and resulted in the Vancouver Declaration). See also National Law Center On
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the commitment to the right to housing “as set forth in the UDHR and as
provided for in the” ICESCR, the CERD, ICEDW, and the CRC, “taking into
account that the right to housing, as included in the above mentioned
international instruments, shall be realized progressively.”67 The Agenda also
elaborates further on the definition of the right, stating for instance that:
“Adequate shelter means more than a roof over one’s head.”68 It includes
provisions to link housing to employment opportunities, transportation and
other basic services, to ensure access to financing, and a to create participatory
processes. It addresses the need for government regulation and legal
frameworks to enable markets to work, and directly to assist vulnerable and
disadvantaged groups, which may be otherwise excluded by the market. It
includes provisions to prohibit discrimination in housing, including that based
on property, combat exclusionary practices, and to protect persons from forced
evictions.69
The Habitat Agenda contains provisions specifically focused on the very
poor and homeless, in no small part due to the active participation of nongovernmental organizations in drafting the document. In addition to direct
assistance to disadvantaged and vulnerable groups—including homeless
persons70—it specifically commits governments to promote supportive services
for homeless and other vulnerable groups, to ensure that homeless persons are
not penalized for their status, and to give “special attention” to the
“circumstances and needs of people living in poverty, people who are
homeless. . .and those belonging to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups” in
implementing all of the document’s commitments. In addition, it includes
commitments to “[p]romot[e] shelter and support[] basic services and facilities
for education and health for the homeless” and to address “the specific needs
and circumstances of children, particularly street children.”71
The document also includes a provision that homeless persons not be
penalized for their status. This latter provision was sponsored and successfully
promoted by the US delegation, at the request of US NGOs, to address the
trend towards the “criminalization” of homelessness in many US cities. It was
inserted in the section addressing “forced evictions,” on the theory that the
current “sweeps” of homeless encampments are the US counterpart to the
forced evictions of squatters living in tent cities in other parts of the world.
Homelessness & Poverty, Habitat II and U.S. Implementation: Background and Overview,
Agenda (1998) [hereinafter Habitat Agenda].
67. Habitat Agenda, supra note 66, at para. 26.
68. Id. at para. 60. The Habitat Agenda uses the terms shelter and housing interchangeably.
69. See generally Janet Ellen Stearns, Voluntary Bonds: The Impact of Habitat II on U.S.
Housing Policy, 16 ST. LOUIS PUB. L. REV. 419 (1998).
70. The document includes homeless and poor people within “vulnerable groups.” See, e.g.,
Habitat Agenda para(s). 34, 61(c)(iv).
71. E.g., Habitat Agenda, supra note 66, at para(s). 38; 40(1); 61(b); (c)(iv); 71; 97(a).
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The Agenda embeds the provisions on homelessness and adequate housing
in a broader policy and legal framework. It defines the concept of adequacy
broadly to include proximity to work, social services and transportation.
Placing housing in the larger context of economic and community
development it emphasizes the need for links between housing and jobs. The
document also makes clear, consistent with developing international
jurisprudence, that government recognition of the right to housing is not
tantamount to government obligation to provide a home free of charge to
everyone.72 Rather, the obligation of government is to pursue and promote
policies that are will promote housing rights through a mix of market and
government forces. 73
The human rights documents create a balanced conceptual framework for
rights and responsibilities and for integrating individual with societal needs.
For example, the Universal Declaration recognizes basic rights to housing,
food, medical care; but it also incorporates the responsibility of the individual:
assistance is foreseen only when needed due to disability or other
circumstances beyond the individual’s control.74
The Agenda incorporates and promotes openness (“transparency”) and
community participation, especially by those most immediately affected, in
carrying out these policies. It also adopts and incorporates an “enabling”
approach, in which the national government brings together and “enables” the
collaboration of different actors, including the private sector, non-profit
organizations, local governments and labor unions. However, within this
approach, the Agenda imposes a special responsibility on governments to
protect members of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.75
The Habitat Agenda is the most recent and comprehensive elaboration on
the meaning of the human right to housing in the contemporary world. While
not a treaty, the Agenda was agreed to and the Istanbul Declaration was signed
by 171 countries, including the United States.76
Using human rights in the US: approaches and limitations. Substantively,
each of the documents described above is highly relevant to addressing

72. See Scott Leckie, Towards an International Convention on Housing Rights: Options at
Habitat II, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1994); see also Habitat II and U.S.
Implementation: Background, supra note 66, at 7-8.
73. See, e.g., Habitat Agenda, supra note 66, at para. 61.
74. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, U.N.G.A. Res. 217 (III) (1948),
at art. 25(1); see also Habitat Agenda, supra note 66, at para. 32.
75. E.g., Istanbul Declaration, at para. 12; Habitat Agenda, supra note 66, at para. 45, 18182.
76. During that process, the US raised serious objections to the inclusion of the right to
housing; however, eventually, the right was included and the US participated in the process and
signed the document. See, e.g., Philip Alston, The U.S. and the Right to Housing—A Funny
Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum, 2 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 120 (1996).
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homelessness in the United States. However, legally their applicability in the
domestic context is by no means clear. Moreover, the status of each document
is not the same.
The UDHR is not a treaty, but rather a declaration; as such, it is arguably
not binding law.77 Nevertheless, many scholars believe that as a result of
consistent practice of states and the international community, the UDHR has
become part of “customary international law,” and has thus become binding
international law.78 Moreover, some argue that even though it may not be
sufficiently accepted to be binding customary law, it is binding by virtue of
states’ adoption of the UN Charter.79
Numerous subsequent treaties and conventions, which are binding
international law, recognize and elaborate on the right to housing as well as
other related economic rights. The most detailed and relevant to housing
rights, the ICESCR, was been signed by the United States in 1972 but has not
yet been ratified.80 The Convention on the Rights of the Child, which includes
recognition of children’s right to housing, has been ratified by 191 nations, but
not by the U.S. However, the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of
Racial Discrimination, which includes at least an acknowledgement of the right
to housing, has been signed and ratified by the U.S. Likewise, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has been signed and
ratified by the U.S.81
In any case, ratification of a treaty does not automatically incorporate it
into US law. While the U.S. Constitution accords treaties the same status as
federal statutes,82 they have typically been ratified with reservations that
provide that they are not “self-executing,”83 and courts have upheld such
reservations.84 Not self-executing means that the treaty provisions are not
judicially enforceable in the U.S. absent passage of implementing legislation
by Congress.85
77. See Leckie, From Housing Needs to Housing Rights, supra note 62, at 15.
78. Id.
79. Id.; See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 701 (1985), reporter’s note 4.
80. The Rights of the Child treaty similarly has not been ratified. Arguably, the signing of
the treaty has some significance: Under article 18 of the Vienna Convention, signatories are
obliged to “refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.” See also
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 11 (obligation of state to provide for
health and basic necessities).
81. Signed by President Johnson in 1966.
82. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; art. 2 § 2.
83. See Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The
Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L. L. 695 (1995).
84. See Foster, 27 U.S. at 314.
85. However, this limitation does not apply to customary international law—law derived
from the long-standing and consistent practice of nations—and it requires no implementing
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None of the human rights treaties is self-executing, and none has been
implemented legislatively. However, the Supreme Court has held that
whenever possible, federal statutes must be interpreted so as not to conflict
with international law.86 This principle, which applies to ratified treaties
whether self-executing or not, and to customary international law, injects
human rights law into US law as an interpretive tool in cases where US law is
unclear and capable of more than one interpretation.
Thus, despite significant limitations, international human rights law can be
a useful supplement to legal advocacy on homelessness. First, it can serve as
an interpretive tool in litigation where federal or state law is unclear. Second,
it can serve a “standard setting” function in policy advocacy. And third, it can
help reframe and re-conceptualize advocacy, placing it on a firmer foundation:
away from charity and dependence and towards justice and interdependence.
Moreover, such a redefining of the issues may also help broaden the advocacy
constituency: human rights are universal; as such, their assertion benefits all,
not merely those in need. This section looks at some of these potential uses;
rather than a comprehensive discussion, it is an outline meant to stimulate
thought, discussion and, potentially, action.
Human rights law as an interpretive guide. According to established
Supreme Court precedent, “an act of congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.”87
Indeed, according to later court decisions and commentators, courts must
interpret ambiguous domestic law in general so that it is consistent with
binding international law, whether derived from treaty or custom. Moreover,
courts in their discretion may rely on non-binding international law—such as
declarations, treaties that have not been ratified, and practices that have not
become customary law—to interpret ambiguous domestic law.88
The Supreme Court has looked to international law as well as the laws and
practices of other nations in analyzing whether a particular punishment
offended civilized standards of decency, and was thus “cruel and unusual”
under Supreme Court the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 89

legislation to become binding law. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). Customary
international law is federal common law, binding on states through the supremacy clause. See
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). A practice becomes binding
customary law when two conditions are met. First, the practice is regularly repeated. Second, the
repetition results from a generally accepted belief that the practice is required by law. See BARRY
CARTER & PHILIP TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 143-44 (1995).
86. See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
87. Id. at 118.
88. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
(1988).
89. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957) (plurality); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Estelle v. Gambelle, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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Similar analyses have been used by the Court in applying the Due Process
Clause.90 However, more recent signs from the Court are less than clear. In a
1988 death penalty case, a four-Justice plurality cited human rights treaties and
international comparative information in applying Eighth Amendment
analysis.91 The following year, in another death penalty case, the plurality was
reversed, and rejected the argument that other countries’ practices are relevant
to that analysis.92
Nonetheless, in a 1997 decision concerning the constitutionality of a state
law banning assisted suicide, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, cited the
practices of other countries (in particular, “Western democrac[ies]”).93 The
Supreme Court’s views on the status of human rights law and international
comparative information may thus be somewhat unclear—and in particular,
may depend on the nature of the case at issue. Currently, at least, it is difficult
to consider human rights law and comparative analysis a reliable basis for
argument. However, at the same time, it is clear that both remain significant
and potentially relevant.94
A number of lower court decisions, federal and state, have referred to or
cited human rights law in potentially relevant contexts. Two cases in the
Second Circuit relied in part on international documents in analyzing prison
conditions under the Eighth Amendment;95 in another case, a federal district
court cited human rights law in ruling that the children of illegal aliens had a
right to an education under the Equal Protection Clause.96 A state court relied
in part on international law in protecting the right to travel within a state;97 and
another state court cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
90. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
91. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988).
92. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). Nonetheless, a reconciliation of these
decisions is possible. The question of the relevance of laws and practices of other nation’ arose in
the context of determining whether the execution of a minor violated “evolving standards of
decency,” one of the standards established in Supreme Court jurisprudence for analyzing Eighth
Amendment claims. By positing that “it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive,”
and then embarking on a review of what he considered to be those standards, Justice Scalia
removed the possibility of looking to international law or information, which would come into
play as an interpretive guide only if there was ambiguity in domestic law.
93. Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 n.8, 718 n.16, 734 (1997).
94. Most recently, in a dissent from a denial of certiorari in this death penalty case, Justice
Breyer cited numerous decisions by foreign courts, noting that while they were obviously not
binding they were nonetheless relevant. Knight v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 459, 462-64 (1999) (mem.).
At a minimum, this suggests that even in the Eight Amendment context, the issue of the relevant
of comparative analysis is still alive.
95. Detainees v. Malcom, 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 117,
1188 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980), aff’d in part, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
96. Plyler v. Doe, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aff’d, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980),
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
97. In re Barbara White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 567 (Ct. App. 1979).
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interpreting a state statute setting a minimum subsistence standards for welfare
benefits.98
According to one state supreme court judge:
It is a potentially powerful argument to say to a court that a right which is
guaranteed by an American constitutional provision, state or federal law,
surely does not fall short of a standard adopted by other civilized nations. It is
a much more difficult, and riskier, argument to tell a court that it must displace
some law of a state or of the United States, with an external international
standard.99

This approach has potential applications in legal advocacy on behalf of
homeless persons in various areas.
For example, challenges to
“criminalization” laws and policies sometimes rely on a right to intrastate
travel, which has not been explicitly recognized as a constitutionally protected
right by the Supreme Court, or a right to “freedom of movement” under the
Due Process Clause, which is not always clearly articulated. The ICCPR,
however, guarantees the “right to liberty of movement,” and freedom to choose
one’s residence “within the territory of a state.”100 Similarly, while education
is not recognized as a fundamental right in the federal constitution, a number
of state constitutions protect it; international law on children’s right to an
education may be relevant to interpreting such provisions.101 Perhaps most
importantly, while a right to housing seems difficult to construct in the U.S.
constitutional context, some movement in that direction may be possible.102
While it is sometimes stated that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
there is no constitutional right to housing,103 in fact this is not quite the case:
the Court held, in the context of a landlord-tenant dispute over habitability, that
there is no right to housing of a particular quality.104 Thus, in theory the

98. Boehm v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 3d 494 (1986).
99. Hans Linde, Comments, 18 INT’L LAW 77, 77-78 (1984) (Oregon Supreme Court judge).
See also Caballero v. Caplinger, 914 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (E.D. La. 1996); Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp., 787, 795-97 (D. Kan. 1980).
100. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12.
101. See, e.g., Connie de la Vega, The Right to Equal Education: Merely a Guiding Principle
or Customary International Legal Right? 11 HARV. BLACK LETTER L.J. 37 (1994).
102. For example, in considering a zoning ordinance that required all household residents to
be members of a family, the court cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for the
proposition that there is a right to privacy within the home, not just within the family. City of
Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980).
103. E.g., Chester Hartman, The Case for a Right to Housing, 9 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE
223, 234 n.19 (1998).
104. Lyndsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). See also Florence Wagman Roisman,
Establishing a Right to Housing: An Advocate’s Guide (1991); Marc-Olivier Herman, Fighting
Homelessness: Can International Human Rights Law Make A Difference?, 2 GEO. J. ON
FIGHTING POVERTY (1994); Cheryl P. Derricotte, Poverty and Property in the United States: A
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question remains open, although not likely given current trends in the Court
and its jurisprudence to be resolved in favor of such a right. However, as
several commentators have noted, numerous federal statutes recognize the
importance of housing and provide funds, albeit insufficient, towards making it
available to all.105 Moreover, federal law protects some housing rights, such as
the right to be free from discrimination; additional rights are guaranteed in
state and local law.106 While incorporating the entire right may be an elusive
and far-off project, using elements of the human right to housing to help
interpret housing rights that are protected may be feasible.107
Standard setting. Even if they do not create binding legal rights,
international documents create standards that nations endorse and to which
they may be held. By adopting the Universal Declaration, for example, the US
publicly committed itself in the world community to abide by the norms it
articulates. Regardless of whether or not the Declaration constitutes binding
international law, it defines and sets a standard that the US has recognized and
adopted. Similarly, while the Habitat Agenda—or Istanbul Declaration—is not
a binding treaty, it is at a minimum a statement of understanding as to
internationally accepted norms and standards. By its terms, it is a commitment
made to and before the international community to carry out a series of steps to
abide by and conform to those standards.
Standard setting can be translated into a useful tool for policy advocacy in
the US. According to the Habitat Agenda, a special session of the UN General
Assembly is scheduled for June 2001 to follow up on Habitat II. In preparation
for the session, known as Habitat II + 5, signatory states are to collect
information and report to UNCHS on the status of their implementation efforts.
While this is an obligation on national governments, there is also provision in
the Agenda for monitoring by other entities, including “communities.” This is
an opportunity for national and local community groups and advocacy
organizations, as well governments, to conduct their own evaluations of
implementation to date.
The UN Commission on Human Settlements (“UNCHS” or “Habitat”), the
UN body responsible for the implementation and oversight of the Agenda, has
developed a set of both “indicators” and “qualitative data” for measuring
implementation outcomes. “Indicators” designed to measure implementation
of the 20 key provisions of the Habitat Agenda by the states-signatories. These
indicators identify key elements of the commitments that are measurable, and
Primer on the Economic Impact of Housing Discrimination and the Importance of a U.S. Right to
Housing, 40 HOWARD L.J. 689 (1997).
105. E.g., Peter Salsich, A Decent Home for Every America: Can the 1949 Goal be Met? 71
N. CAROLINA L. REV. 1619 (1993).
106. E.g. Hartman, supra note 103, at 234-35.
107. See Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor,
39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987).
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seek quantifiable data relevant to them. The major Habitat II commitments
covered by these indicators include the following, of particular relevance to US
advocates on homelessness and housing.108
Provide security of tenure. The two indicators designed to measure
compliance with this commitment concern tenure types and evictions. With
respect to tenure types, the relevant data is: “percentages of woman and manheaded households in the following tenure categories: (a) owned; (purchasing);
(c) private rental; (d) social housing; (e) sub-tenancy; (f) rent free; (g) squatter
no rent; (h) squatter rent paid; (i) other, including homelessness. With respect
to evictions, the relevant data—for developed countries—focuses on evictions
for non-payment of rent; however, it also includes evictions during large public
works projects [presumably from public places].109 Significantly, in the
section on forced evictions, the Habitat Agenda specifically states that
homeless persons are not to be penalized for their status.110
Promote the right to adequate housing. Within this area, UNCHS
identifies a qualitative data set, including “yes/no” questions regarding whether
the constitution or national law promotes housing rights, and protects against
eviction. This area also includes an indicator focused on the housing price to
income ratio.111
Promote social integration and support disadvantaged groups. The
indicator measures numbers of poor households, according to the poverty line.
While these indicators are quite general, they can be used by advocates
both locally and nationally to place the US in an international context and to
place homelessness and housing in human rights context. For example,
advocates can incorporate these concepts in their advocacy to local city
councils, using for instance the Habitat Agenda language on forced evictions,
which specifically admonishes against penalizing homeless persons for their
status as part of their argument against sweeps. The indicators system, and the
monitoring and oversight mechanisms it is tied to, allows advocates to argue
that cities pursuing such policies are violating the Habitat II commitments,
lessening US compliance with this international norm.
Some US cities have adopted resolutions identifying themselves as human
rights cities. In particular, three California cities—San Francisco, Berkeley
and Oakland—have passed resolutions affirming the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights and pledging to oppose any legislation or actions that infringes
108. See UNCHS, Guidelines for Collecting and Analysing Urban Indicators Data; see also
UNCHS’s Urban Observatory System, available at http://www.urbanobservatory.org/network.
109. For developing countries, the indicator refers mainly to squatter evictions. Tellingly, in
the U.S. “evictions” of homeless people are typically more akin to the conditions in developing
countries.
110. Habaitat Agenda, supra note 66, para. 61 (b).
111. Other qualitative questions concern barriers to home- and land-ownership by women.
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on those rights.112 Though these resolutions are non-binding, they can give
particular meaning to monitoring efforts in those particular cities: a city that
has adopted such a resolution has a particular obligation to respect the human
rights of homeless people.113
The Habitat Agenda provides that indicators may be modified as
appropriate to a nation’s particular circumstances, and this may be useful for
US advocates as well. Developing minimum standards that cities must follow
with regard to their homeless residents, within the Habitat context could create
a specific objective against which cities are measured and which they work to
meet. For example, meeting minimum human rights criteria on homelessness
in the criminalization context could mean no sweeps without adequate indoor
spaces.
Reframing. In addition to litigation and policy advocacy tools, an
international human rights approach offers an opportunity to reframe the
underlying policy analysis and public debate. This reframing is critical,
especially given hostile and punitive assumptions about poor and homeless
people that are pervasive in current policy and discussion, and that drive and
underlie much policy and law.114 Reframing can also provide a context for
lawyers working on behalf of homeless people, and on behalf of solutions to
homelessness, that motivates and gives meaning to their effort.115 Analyzing
homelessness within a human rights framework offers several possibilities for
reframing the issue.
First, human rights are universal. These are not rights granted only to the
poor or needy; they are not welfare benefits or even entitlements granted out of
the largesse of the more fortunate, or associated with a particular political
party. Rather, they are rights inherent in all human beings by virtue of their
status as such. In this sense, they are inclusive and unifying.116 While
homeless people and other “vulnerable groups” are accorded special
protection, this is done within a wide context: these are groups excluded from
the normal housing markets. This articulates a basis for this protection rooted
in circumstance. As such, it suggests at least a possibility for seeing that

112. See Resolution No. 74206 C.M.S., Resolution of the Oakland City Council on
Economic, Sical and Cultural Human Rights, Apr. 28, 1998; Berkeley City Council, Resolution
Supporting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
113. See San Francisco Coalition on Homelessness, “Mouthing ‘Human Rights’ Won’t Cover
Up Wrongs,” STREET SHEET, Mar. 1999 (noting contradiction between city policy and actions).
114. See Edelman, supra note 167.
115. See Melanie B. Abbott, Seeking Shelter Under a Deconstructed Roof: Homelessness and
Critical Lawyering, 64 TENN. L. REV. 269 (1997) (importance of underlying principles and
beliefs in motivating lawyers on behalf of homeless people).
116. In contrast, welfare and other benefits specifically for the poor, particularly in recent
years, have often been perceived, and resented, as special treatment for the needy.
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protection as part of a larger scheme of structural dynamics that may not allow
all members of a society to engage actively or successfully in the market
economy. Human rights provide the basis of a safety net to fall back on in the
event of such exclusion—for all.
This universal approach is more consistent with a view oriented towards
justice rather than charity. If these rights belong to all, then their denial should
be a concern of all: the phrase “it could happen to anyone” takes on some real
meaning. The denial of some type of right to anyone is a real, not simply
theoretical possibility.117 The protection of these rights thus should be of
concern to all; it should not be left to happenstance or to the vagaries of
individual conscience and charity.118 At the same time, however, human right
principles include the notion of individual responsibility as well as rights, and
this too is more consistent with justice rather than charity. These principles
provide that those who are able to will work, and concern themselves with the
availability of jobs and the adequacy of wages. But they also provide that
those unable to work due to circumstance beyond their control will not be left
destitute and homeless. Thus, this approach focuses attention on issues such as
job availability and wage adequacy rather than on issues such as dependency,
laziness and “cultural” inadequacies.
Second, and relatedly, the human rights approach injects a different sort of
authority into debate about poverty and homelessness. On one level, the
appeal to international norms places debate outside the US and current political
climates. By invoking the world stage, it appeals to US policymakers to
consider a bigger perspective. How will the US be perceived? How are its
national policies affecting its international standing? How can homelessness
and dire poverty be tolerated in a country with our resources? At international
perspective encourages us to look at the US reality from a stranger’s
perspective, one in which these questions may appear more starkly.
On another level, the appeal to human rights as a higher, or more
fundamental, authority may allow for a different type of discussion: By
117. In fact, housing rights of others are protected. For example, the federal tax code grants
homeowners deductions; some benefit programs take into account housing costs in setting levels
of assistance; and of course, the Constitution protects property ownership. Incorporating these
protections into a framework that recognizes housing rights as human rights available to all helps
clarify that defending the housing rights of one set of people—such as the homeless—advances
the interests of all. Of course, in practice these interests may at times be at odds. For instance,
low income housing groups have argued that housing for homeless people could be paid for
through a cap on the homeowner’s mortgage deduction, see also Hartman, supra note 103, at 239.
But placing both in the context of the right to housing may help frame the conflict as one over
priorities, opposed to conflict between two groups of people.
118. Moreover, to the extent that a human rights approach also includes the principle that
human rights are indivisible—namely, that civil and political rights and economic and social
rights are interdependent and cannot exist without each other—then this universalism becomes
stronger.
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assuming the inherent value and worthiness for all individuals, it may obviate
debate over the worthiness—or lack thereof—of particular recipients of aid,
while at the same time also assuming their complementary obligation to
reciprocate. At a time when national debate has focused much attention on the
responsibilities of the poor and homeless, human rights analysis provides a
framework that has a built in balance between rights and responsibilities, as
well as grounding in external realities.
For example, welfare reform has required work, and sanctions failure to
comply with myriad requirements designed to instill a sense of responsibility.
But it does not address the issue of job availability or adequacy (wage,
transportation or child care) or indeed protect the right to work at a living
wage. Thus, to the extent that advocacy simply focuses on opposing the
punitive aspects of the policies it risks advocating for dependency: a welfare
check, not a job. Similarly, efforts to impose “quality of life” laws that in
effect criminalize homelessness argue that homeless people should be subject
to the same standards of behavior as everyone else. To argue otherwise, they
say, is to “enable” bad behavior. Advocates opposing these efforts risk
appearing to advocate for a right to sleep on the street. A human rights
approach can place the issue in larger context: the lack of alternatives, in
particular the gross violation of the right to housing which requires people to
live in public places and invariably accompanies concerted efforts to punish
homeless people for being in public.
IV. CONCLUSION
The globalization of national economies places new focus on international
dependency and also on human rights. Habitat II brought particular focus and
debate to housing rights, culminating in a document with particular attention to
the housing needs and rights of the poor and homeless. It also created a
mechanism for ongoing monitoring and reporting, with a major, five-year
follow-up UN conference scheduled for June 2001. In this context it is
appropriate that advocates for poor and homeless people become familiar with
basic human rights concepts. These concepts directly address issues of
concern to advocates: issues such as housing, jobs and health care. While they
may not currently be legally binding, human rights principles can be integrated
into advocacy strategies so as to enhance and add to them.
Let us return to the legal clinic at the shelter with which this essay began.
Will a human rights approach add anything to our legal team’s ability to aid
those who seek legal help simply because they cannot find a job that pays
enough or housing they can afford? Most likely, it will not add much that is
immediately helpful. But it will add something that is important: a framework
of rights and obligations within which this group of people belongs. As such,
it also adds an understanding of justice to aspire to and work towards, and a
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legal structure to which to attach it. Translating these concepts into concrete
tools and relief can only happen incrementally.
Nevertheless, as the world continues to shrink and global interdependence
becomes more apparent, there is a real opportunity to make human rights more
meaningful in the US. Advocates should not wait but rather be proactive in
adding this advocacy tool to the mix in advocating to protect the rights of
homeless Americans and to bring an end to homelessness in America.
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